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One of the most challenging aspects in the analysis and modelling of financial markets, including Credit
Default Swap (CDS) markets, is the presence of an emergent, intermediate level of structure standing in
between the microscopic dynamics of individual financial entities and the macroscopic dynamics of the
market as a whole. This elusive, mesoscopic level of organisation is often sought for via factor models
that ultimately decompose the market according to geographic regions and economic industries. However,
at a more general level the presence of mesoscopic structure might be revealed in an entirely data-
driven approach, looking for a modular and possibly hierarchical organisation of the empirical correlation
matrix between financial time series. The crucial ingredient in such an approach is the definition of an
appropriate null model for the correlation matrix. Recent research showed that community detection
techniques developed for networks become intrinsically biased when applied to correlation matrices.
For this reason, a method based on Random Matrix Theory has been developed, which identifies the
optimal hierarchical decomposition of the system into internally correlated and mutually anti-correlated
communities. Building upon this technique, here we resolve the mesoscopic structure of the CDS market
and identify groups of issuers that cannot be traced back to standard industry/region taxonomies, thereby
being inaccessible to standard factor models. We use this decomposition to introduce a novel default risk
model that is shown to outperform more traditional alternatives.
Keywords: Financial Time Series; Correlation Modelling; Correlation Matrices; Community Detection;
Credit Default Swaps; Applications to Default Risk; Multi-factor Models)
JEL Classification: C15; C53; D85; G11; L14
1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-08 laid bare the downside of a highly interconnected financial system by
evidencing that each link constitutes a channel through which shocks can propagate rapidly across
markets and asset classes. This has been popularised by the too-interconnected-to-fail motto, stress-
ing the impact that the failure of a highly central node would have on the rest of the network.
Capturing financial complexity within models has been a major challenge since, for financial insti-
tutions and regulators alike.
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Complexity-inspired models rest upon the evidence that economic and financial systems have
many of the key properties characterising natural complex systems: they are composed by many
heterogeneous units that interact with each other in a non-linear fashion, usually in the presence of
feedback (Amaral and Ottino 2004, Mantegna et al. 2000). A tractable framework for the quanti-
tative analysis of many complex systems is provided by networks. Techniques from network theory
have been used to study a variety of financial assets, including equities (Mantegna 1999, Mantegna
et al. 2000, Onnela et al. 2003), exchange rates (McDonald et al. 2005, 2008), commodities (Sieczka
and Ho lyst 2009), bonds (Bernaschi et al. 2002) and interest rates (Di Matteo et al. 2004); however,
despite the growing literature on networks in finance, the effort for incorporating these techniques
in models used for the pricing and risk management of individual portfolios has remained at a very
early stage (Anagnostou et al. 2018, 2019).
In addition to the complexity of the financial system, the global financial crisis uncovered the
significant weaknesses of the regulatory framework for capitalising risks from trading activities.
Since the onset of the crisis, a major source of losses and of the build up of leverage transpired
in the trading book: an instrumental factor was that the existing capital framework for market
risk, based on the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 1996), was not able to capture some key risks. In 2009, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced a set of revisions to the market risk framework
to address the most crucial shortcomings, commonly referred to as the Basel 2.5 package of reforms
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009, 2011). These reforms included requirements for
the banks to hold additional capital against default risk and rating migration risk, known as the
Incremental Risk Charge (IRC). The IRC is calculated using a value-at-risk (VaR) model at the
99.9% confidence level over a one-year time horizon.
Although Basel 2.5 was an important improvement, some of the structural flaws of the market risk
framework remained unaddressed. To this end, the Committee initiated a fundamental review of
the trading book (FRTB) to enhance the design and coherence of the market risk capital standard,
in line with the lessons learned from the global financial crisis (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2016). In FRTB the IRC is replaced with a Default Risk Charge (DRC) model. As
an autonomous modelled approach, the IRC effectively dismisses diversification effects between
credit-related risks and other risks. Moreover, the more complex IRC models were identified as
source of undesired variability in the market risk weighted assets. Under the revised framework,
the DRC models will measure the trading portfolio’s default risk separate from all market risks. As
an additional constraint, the DRC places limitations on the types of risk factors and correlations
that can be used within the model. More specifically, banks must use a default simulation model
with multiple systematic risk factors of two different types and default correlations must be based
on credit spreads or on listed equity prices, covering a period of 10 years which includes a period
of stress.
In order to meet the requirement of two different types of systematic factors for the default
model, Laurent et al. (2016) proposed to use principal components analysis (PCA) to identify
the common systematic factors that drive issuer returns. While the factors obtained using this
approach are explanatory in a statistical sense, they usually lack of an obvious economic meaning.
Moreover, the stability of such factors over time might prove insufficient. A more common approach
among practitioners is employing observable economic factors, representing the overall state of the
economy or effects related to particular geographic regions or industry sectors. An example of this
approach is described in Wilkens and Predescu (2017).
Motivated by the absence of models encoding complexity-based ‘inputs’, our paper takes up the
challenge by focusing on one of the key aspects of complex systems, i.e. the presence of a community
structure. Detecting the presence of communities means individuating clusters of units sharing some
kind of similarity: when considering financial systems, this usually boils down at identifying sets of
stocks sharing similar price dynamics. We focus on credit default swap (CDS) spread time series
with the aim of individuating clusters whose similarities cannot trace back to the standard, region-
and sector-wise ones. To achieve this goal, we employ a recently-proposed community detection
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method that take as input the empirical correlation matrix induced by a given set of time series
(MacMahon and Garlaschelli 2015, Almog et al. 2015) and, then, we employ the output of such
a method to identify communities of issuers and define a novel default risk model. The variant
we propose is shown to outperform more traditional versions. Our contributions in this paper are,
therefore, threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge our study is the first one that detects
mesoscopic communities of issuers by applying the approach based on Random Matrix Theory
(RMT) on CDS time series. Second, on the basis of the detected communities we derive factors
and develop a new portfolio credit risk model that is in line with regulatory requirements for DRC
calculations. Third, we set up four synthetic test portfolios and present the impact of considering
different systematic factors on the quantiles of the generated loss distributions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief definition
of CDS contracts and an overview of the dataset used for the present analysis. In Section 3 we
describe the theoretical principles upon which the community detection method for correlation
matrices employed here is based and analyse the results obtained using the data described in
Section 2. Section 4 is, instead, dedicated to the description of our novel default risk model whose
key ingredient is represented by a previously-ignored factor, i.e. the community-driven one, as well
as a simulation study on synthetic test portfolios. Finally, in Section 5 we summarise our findings
and draw conclusions.
2. Preliminary definitions
2.1. Credit default swaps
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial contract in which a protection buyer, A, buys insurance
from a protection seller, B, against the default of a reference entity, C. More specifically, regular
coupon payments with respect to a contractual notional and a fixed rate, the CDS spread, are
swapped with a payment of in the event of default of C, where RR, known as the recovery rate, is
a contract parameter representing the fraction of investment which is assumed be recovered in the
event of default of C.
CDS spreads reflect the market participants’ view on probability of default. Thus, practitioners
often rely on them to obtain market-implied parameters which are key inputs to their models.
For instance, in the case of credit valuation adjustment (CVA)1, the default probabilities are
obtained from CDS spreads. Apart from derivatives valuation, CDS spreads are used extensively for
estimating correlations in market risk and capital models (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2016).
2.2. Description of the data-set
The raw CDS data-set is provided by Markit and consists of daily CDS spreads for a range of
maturities covering the period between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2016. Markit maintains a
network of market makers who contribute quotes from their official books and records for thousands
of entities on a daily basis. Using the contributed quotes, the daily CDS spreads for each entity, as
well as the daily recovery rates used to price the contracts, are calculated. In addition, the data-set
contains information on the names of the underlying reference entities, recovery rates, seniority
of the debt on which the contract is priced on, restructuring type, number of quote contributors,
region, sector, average of the ratings from Standard & Poors, Moodys, Fitch Group of each entity
and currency of the quote.
1CVA is the difference between the risk-free portfolio value and the actual portfolio market value that takes into account the
risk of a counterpartys default. Its magnitude depends on the probability of default of the counterparty, the future exposures
of the underlying derivative or portfolio, and the loss given default.
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Table 1.: Distribution of 786 entities across regions and sectors.
Region N Sector N
Africa 5 Basic materials 51
Asia 132 Consumer goods 104
Eastern Europe 14 Consumer services 94
Europe 239 Energy 52
India 7 Financials 164
Latin America 13 Government 64
Middle East 9 Health Care 33
North America 342 Industrials 86
Oceania 25 Technology 31
Telecommunication services 42
Utilities 69
Since Markit data are characterised by a number of attributes, it is possible to have multiple
CDS data series for the same issuer. In order to obtain unique, representative time series, we apply
a set of selection criteria. First, we select the CDS spreads of entities for the five-year tenor for our
analysis; it is observed that Markit’s raw data is more complete for this tenor, since five-year CDS
contracts are the most liquid. For the same reason, we select senior unsecured debt for corporates
and foreign debt for sovereigns. Finally, we set up a hierarchy for the document clause/restructuring
type which defines what constitutes a credit event and select the series denominated in Euro for
the European issuers and in U.S. dollar for issuers from the rest of the world. Besides the above
steps, we apply a couple of additional filtering steps to the CDS data to retain the most liquid
quotes. After applying these pre-processing steps, we are left with a total of 786 entities and 2608
trading days. The distribution of issuers across regions and sectors is shown in Table 1.
3. Community detection on CDS correlation matrices
3.1. Methods
Basic notation. In this subsection we introduce the basic notation and describe the community-
detection method for time series introduced in MacMahon and Garlaschelli (2015). Financial mar-
kets are represented as a set of time series X1 . . . XN , each one encoding the temporally ordered
activity of the i-th unit of the system over, say, T time-steps, i.e.
Xi ≡ {xi(1) . . . xi(T )}, ∀ i. (1)
In our case i is a credit issuer. The mutual interactions between the series considered above are
summed up by an X ×N correlation matrix, i.e. a matrix C whose generic entry Cij reads
Cij =
Cov[Xi, Xj ]√
Var[Xi] ·Var[Xj ]
, ∀ i, j (2)
i.e. the Pearson coefficient between series i and j, with
Cov[Xi, Xj ] = Xi ·Xj −Xi ·Xj , ∀ i, j (3)
and
Var[Xi] = X2i −Xi
2
, ∀ i; (4)
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in the above equations, the bar is assumed to denote a temporal average, i.e.
Xi =
∑T
t=1 xi(t)
T
, ∀ i, (5)
X2i =
∑T
t=1 x
2
i (t)
T
, ∀ i, (6)
Xi ·Xj =
∑T
t=1 xi(t) · xj(t)
T
, ∀ i, j. (7)
As frequently done in order to filter out the inherent heterogeneity of time series, each series
Xi has been standardised by subtracting the temporal average Xi and dividing the result by the
standard deviation σi =
√
Var[Xi]; in other words, Xi has been redefined as (Xi−Xi)/σi in a such
a way to ensure that Xi = 0, Var[Xi] = 1 and Cij = Cov[Xi, Xj ] = Xi ·Xj .
One of most challenging problems in the field of complex systems is that of extracting information
from the matrix C. As we are considering financial markets, we would be interested in individuating
sets of issuers sharing a similar CDS spread dynamics. More formally, this amounts at inspecting
the community structure of the considered set of issuers, i.e. the presence of (internally cohesive)
modules of issuers.
Over the past years, several techniques to retrieve information regarding the modularity of multi-
ple time series have been proposed (see MacMahon and Garlaschelli (2015) and references therein).
One of the most promising approach is that of applying community detection techniques to em-
pirical correlation matrices: however, as existing methods are tailored on graphs, they suffer from
statistical bias whenever applied ‘as they are’ to correlation matrices (see MacMahon and Gar-
laschelli (2015) and references therein).
Recently, a method based on Random Matrix Theory (RMT) (Potters et al. 2005, Mehta 2004)
has been proposed (MacMahon and Garlaschelli 2015): when applied to financial time series, this
algorithm has been proven to be able to capture the dynamical modularity of real markets, by
identifying clusters of stocks which are positively correlated internally but anti-correlated with
each other. In what follows, we will provide a brief explanation of the method. More details can
be found in the original reference (MacMahon and Garlaschelli 2015).
Spectral analysis of random correlation matrices. Let us start by inspecting the properties of
random correlation matrices. The latter are constructed by considering N completely random time
series of length T (more precisely, time series whose entries are independent, identically distributed
random variables with zero mean and finite variance): the matrix encoding the correlations of this
set of series is a N × N Wishart matrix, whose eigenvalues follow (in the limits N → +∞ and
T → +∞ with 1 < T/N < +∞) the so-called Marcenko-Pastur distribution (Laloux et al. 1999),
reading
ρ(λ) =
T
N
√
(λ+ − λ)(λ− λ−)
2piλ
if λ− ≤ λ ≤ λ+ (8)
and ρ(λ) = 0 otherwise, with λ+ and λ− being, respectively, the maximum and the minimum
eigenvalue:
λ± =
[
1±
√
N
T
]2
. (9)
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Figure 1.: Left panel: smoothed eigenvalue density of the correlation matrix extracted from the
CDS spreads of N = 786 issuers during the period 2007-2016 (T = 2608); for comparison we have
plotted the Marcenko-Pastur density function (8) coming from N uncorrelated series of duration T .
Inset: same plot, but including the highest eigenvalue corresponding to the ‘market’. Right panel:
eigenvalues density distribution of randomised CDS data. The figure shows the agreement between
empirical (in blue) and random (in red) distributions once the original data are shuffled.
The method we are going to describe implements the idea that, while the eigenvalues of an em-
pirical correlation matrix falling within these boundaries can be attributed to random noise, any
eigenvalue smaller than λ− and larger than λ+ is to be considered as representing some mean-
ingful structure in the data. The result above leads to the possibility of expressing any empirical
correlation matrix as the sum of two components, i.e.
C = C(r) + C(s) (10)
where C(r) is the tensor random component, induced by the eigenvalues in the random bulk (i.e.
∀ i such that λi ∈ [λ−, λ+]) and reading
C(r) ≡
∑
i
(λ−≤λi≤λ+)
λi|vi〉〈vi| (11)
and C(s) is the tensor structural component, aggregated from the remaining eigenvalues. The struc-
tural component C(s) can be further subdivided, upon considering the existence of the so called
market mode. As it has been shown in a number of previous studies (MacMahon and Garlaschelli
2015, Almog et al. 2015, Laloux et al. 1999), a representative characteristic of the spectrum of
empirical correlation matrices is the existence of an eigenvalue λm which is orders of magnitude
larger that the remaining ones; in case financial stocks are considered, such a leading eigenvalue
embodies the common factor driving all the constituents of a given market. As the effect of λm is
that of pushing all nodes into the same community, we need to properly discount it, by focusing
on the ‘reduced’ portion of the structured spectrum defined by the condition λi ∈ (λ+, λm). This
leads to a further decomposition of the correlation matrix, i.e.
C = C(r) + C(g) + C(m) (12)
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where
C(m) ≡ λm|vm〉〈vm| (13)
represents the tensor portion induced by the market mode and
C(g) ≡
∑
i
(λ+<λi<λm)
λi|vi〉〈vi| (14)
represents the tensor portion filtered from both the random noise and the common factor. As a
consequence, the correlations encoded in C(g) are neither at the individual level nor at the level
of the entire market but at the level of groups of stocks (i.e. at the mesoscale in the network
jargon). Remarkably, the eigenvectors contributing to C(g) have alternating signs, allowing for the
detection of groups affected in a similar manner by some (other) common factors (MacMahon and
Garlaschelli 2015, Potters et al. 2005).
In Figure 1 we plot the eigenvalue density distribution characterising the empirical correlation
matrix of N = 786 CDS spreads (corresponding to T = 2608 daily log-returns for the period
2007-2016) together with the Marcenko-Pastur distribution coming from N totally uncorrelated
series of duration T (shown in red). The maximum expected eigenvalue amounts at approximately
λ+ = 1.27. The inset is the fully zoomed-out version of the plot, illustrating that the empirical
correlation matrix has a maximum eigenvalue of about λm = 216 (i.e. the market mode), in addition
to a few other eigenvalues lying between λ+ and λm. The eigenvector |vm〉 corresponding to λm has
all positive signs. We also inspect whether the system follows the Marcenko-Pastur distribution
once the original data re shuffled. To this aim, we, first, randomly permute the entries of each time
series separately, thus destroying the daily correlations; then, we check if the eigenvalues of the
correlation matrix of the shuffled set of series follow the Marcenko-Pastur distribution: as fig. 1
shows, this is indeed the case.
Community detection on filtered correlation matrices. Community detection is an active
field of research within network theory. Among the many proposed approaches, the most popular
one is based on the maximisation of the quantity known as modularity, a score function measuring
the optimality of a given partition by comparing the empirical pattern of interconnections with the
one predicted by a properly-defined benchmark model. It is defined as
Q(σ) =
1
||A||
N∑
i,j=1
[aij − 〈aij〉] δ(σi, σj) (15)
where aij is the generic entry of the network adjacency matrix A, 〈aij〉 is the probability that nodes
i and j establish a connection according to the chosen benchmark (i.e. the expectation of whether
a link exists or not under some suitable null hypothesis), σ is the N -dimensional vector encoding
the information carried by a given partition (the i-th component, σi, denotes the module to which
node i is assigned) and the Kronecker delta δ(σi, σj) ensures that only the nodes within the same
modules provide a positive contribution to the sum. The normalisation factor ||A|| = ∑Ni,j=1 aij
guarantees that −1 ≤ Q(σ) ≤ 1 (when undirected networks are considered, it equals twice the
number of connections).
Much of the previous research in community detection for financial time series has explored the
approach of considering the empirical correlation matrix C as a weighted network and searching
for communities by using the weighted extension of the modularity, defined by posing aij ≡ Cij
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and
〈aij〉 = 〈Cij〉 = sisj
2W
, ∀ i, j (16)
with si =
∑N
l=1Cil = Cov[Xi, Xtot] and W =
∑N
i,j=1Cij = Var[Xtot] (having defined xtot(t) =∑T
t=1 xi(t)). According to MacMahon and Garlaschelli (2015), however, this approach may lead
to biased results. As a consequence, a null model encoding the spectral properties of correlation
matrices has been proposed, i.e.
〈aij〉 = 〈Cij〉 = C(r)ij + C(m)ij , ∀ i, j (17)
in turn leading to the following redefinition of modularity
Q(σ) =
1
||C||
N∑
i,j=1
[
Cij −
(
C
(r)
ij + C
(m)
ij
)]
δ(σi, σj) (18)
(with ||C|| = ∑Ni,j=1Cij), a ‘novel’ quantity whose maximisation outputs a partition of a given set
of time series upon filtering out the random noise and the market component.
3.2. Results
Community detection. We now proceed with the application of the methodology described
in Section 3.1. Figure 2 shows the output of the Louvain algorithm when applied to the daily
CDS spread data of 786 issuers, covering the period between 1 January 2007 and 31 December
2016. The algorithm is making use of the modularity defined in Equation (18), which is able to
discount random as well as market-wide effects. With the CDS data, we obtain three mesoscopic
communities, labelled A, B and C, characterised (as explained in the previous sections) by positive
correlations within them and negative correlations between them. The pie charts represent the
composition of each community according to the industry and region of the constituent issuers for
Figure 2a and Figure 2b respectively. The colour legends can be found in Tables 2 and 3.
From the data in Figure 2a, it is apparent that every community contains a range of issuers
from all industry sectors: no pattern of association between sector and community structure is
immediately evident. For Community A, it can be seen that over a quarter of issuers are classified
as Financials ( ), while another quarter of the community comprises issuers from the Consumer
Goods ( ) and Consumer Services ( ) sectors; the rest of the industry sectors are represented with
lower percentages, ranging from slightly less than 10% for Utilities ( ) to approximately 3% for
Technology ( ). Issuers from Financials ( ) are slightly less frequent in Community B, accounting
for approximately 15% of the total issuers, while consumer Goods ( ), Consumer Services ( ),
and Industrials ( ) sectors follow with similar percentages; the rest of the community consists of
issuers from all sectors with lower percentages, such as Energy ( ) and Utilities ( ) with slightly
less than 10% each. Almost 40% of Community C consists of Financials ( ) and Government ( )
issuers: interestingly, the proportion of Government ( ) issuers in Community C is significantly
higher than the corresponding proportion in Communities A and B and almost twice as high as
the one in the full sample of 786 issuers; issuers from the Consumer Goods ( ) and Industrials ( )
sectors are also quite frequent, constituting approximately a quarter of Community C.
We now turn to the relative breakdown of the issuers of each community according to region. As
Figure 2b demonstrates, the identified communities display a high degree of overlap with region
classification. Communities A and B are dominated by the regions Europe ( ) and North America
( ) respectively. On the other hand, Community C contains the bulk of issuers from Asia ( ),
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Figure 2.: CDS market community structure. The figure shows the communities detected on CDS
spread data for 786 issuers during the period 1 January 2007-31 December 2016. The communities
were generated by the modified Louvain algorithm (MacMahon and Garlaschelli 2015) using daily
log-returns. Individual communities are labelled A, B, C and the pie charts represent the relative
composition of each community with respect to the sector (left panel) and region (right panel) of
the component entities.
Table 2.: The 11 industry sectors with the colour representation used to highlight the sectors in
the following figures.
Region N Sector N
Basic materials: Health care:
Consumer goods: Industrials:
Consumer services: Technology:
Energy: Telecommunication services
Financials: Utilities:
Government
Table 3.: The 9 regions with the colour representation used to highlight the sectors in the following
figures.
Region N Sector N
Africa: Latin America:
Asia: Middle East:
Eastern Europe: North America:
Europe: Oceania
India:
9
while issuers from Oceania ( ) and India ( ) are represented exclusively in this community. It is
interesting, however, that a considerable amount of issuers from Europe ( ) and North America ( )
can be found in Community C, meaning that over the course of the ten-year period under analysis
they were more correlated with issuers from Asia ( ) or Oceania ( ) than with most of the issuers
located in their own region. A possible explanation is that some issuers such as international banks
registered in Europe and North America have considerable exposure to Asia-Pacific.
Hierarchical community structure. The methodology described in Section 3.1 can be applied
iteratively, to individuate smaller subcommunities which may be nested inside larger communities.
As the leading eigenvalue of the correlation matrix represents something that all issuers in the
market have in common, the leading eigenvalue of the correlation matrix restricted to a specific
individual community can be interpreted as something that all issuers in that community have
in common: by washing out the effects of this ‘community mode’, one can detect the ‘residual’
modular structure (internal to each community). Naturally, subcommunities within each parent
community are anticorrelated with each other while being positively correlated internally.
The results of a single iteration over the communities A, B, and C (summarised in Figure 2)
are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. It can be seen from the graph that the degree of overlap with
the sector-based classification is higher for subcommunities than for communities. Moreover, the
overlap with the region-based classification is even more pronounced.
Community A is divided is four subcommunities labelled A1 through A4. A1 and A3 contain a
range of issuers from all sectors, while A2 is dominated by Financials ( ) and three quarters of
A4 is constituted by Energy ( ) and Utilities ( ). In all four subcommunities, Europe ( ) is the
leading region and there is a small percentage of issuers from North America ( ); moreover, Middle
East ( ), Eastern Europe ( ) and Africa ( ) are represented exclusively in A1 while issuers from
Asia ( ) can be found exclusively in A3.
Community B is split in five subcommunities. B1 is quite heterogeneous, including issuers from
all different industry sectors. B2 includes issuers from the Energy ( ) and Utilities ( ) sectors.
Approximately half of B3 and B4 include are constituted by Consumer Goods ( ) and Consumer
Services ( ) issuers, with Industrials ( ) and Health Care ( ) accounting for another quarter of B4.
Finally, B5 is dominated by Financials ( ) and Government ( ). From a geographic perspective,
subcommunities of B are all dominated by North America ( ), with some issuers from Europe
( ) being present in B1 and to a lesser extent in B3 and B5. B2 contains issuers only from North
America ( ) and, with very few exceptions, the same holds for B3 and B4 as well. Most of the
issuers from Latin America ( ) can be found in B5 with almost a third of this subcommunity being
from that region.
Moving to the four subcommunities of Community C, almost half of the issuers in subcommunity
C1 are equally split among Consumer Goods ( ) and Industrials ( ). Issuers from the Government
( ) and Financials ( ) sectors constitute more than half of subcommunities C2 and C4. Financials
( ) are frequent in subcommunity C3 as well, followed by Consumer Services ( ), i.e. the second
most frequent industry sector. In terms of regional classification, although Community C is more
heterogeneous than A and B, its subcommunities reveal that issuers from Asia ( are concentrated
in subcommunities C1 and C4, with C4 containing almost all the issuers from India ( ). C3
consists of issuers from Oceania ( ), with a small number of issuers from Europe ( ). The bulk
of the European issuers in community C is concentrated in C2, making up almost 50% of the
subcommunity. The rest of C2 consists of issuers from Eastern Europe ( ) and North America ( )
with about 15% each, and Middle East ( ) with slightly over 10%.
In summary, these results provide important insights into the structure of the CDS market. It is
suggested that the three communities initially detected are quite heterogeneous as far as industry
sectors are concerned, while they overlap to a greater extent when considering a regional-based
classification of issuers. Interestingly, although Communities A and B are dominated by Europe
( ) and North America ( ), some European and North American issuers are clustered with issuers
from Asia ( ) and Oceania ( ) in Community C. At the second iteration of the method, some
10
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Figure 3.: Subcommunity structure of the three communities of the CDS market by sector. Although
at first glance the subcommunities seem quite heterogeneous with respect to sector, after close
inspection it can be seen that some of them are dominated by certain sectors, for example A2
and B5 are dominated by Financials ( ) and Government ( ), while A4 and B2 are dominated by
Energy ( ) and Utilities ( ).
of the obtained subcommunities are dominated by certain sectors: for instance, A2 and B5 are
dominated by Financials ( ) and Government ( ), while A4 and B2 are dominated by Energy
( ) and Utilities ( ). The overlap between regions and subcommunities is even better than the
one between sectors and subcommunities. These results have implications for the management of
portfolios of credit risky instruments, demonstrating that after global effects have been filtered
out, default risk dependence is related to regional effects to a larger extent than to sectoral effects.
This seems to be in line with previous evidence from equity markets (Heston and Rouwenhorst
1994), indicating that industry-specific effects are less significant than region effects. In addition,
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Figure 4.: Subcommunity structure of the three communities of the CDS market by region. The
overlap between region and subcommunities is better than the one between sectors and subcom-
munities.
as far as default risk is concerned, it appears that neither diversification over regions alone nor
diversification over industries alone can achieve the optimal diversification benefits, a result that
is aligned with Aretz and Pope (2013).
Community detection: a temporal multiresolution analysis. Once the mesoscopic organi-
sation of the CDS market has been detected, one may wonder how stable (i.e. ‘robust over time’)
this organisation is. This amounts at investigating the presence of discrepancies from the original
community structure once the log-returns constituting the time series are sampled at different fre-
quencies, e.g. weekly or monthly. For consistency with the results presented so far, the same period
of ten years is considered but our analysis is now focused on the set of time series induced by the
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Figure 5.: Left panel (5a): Divergence from original community structure for the five data sets of
different sampling frequencies. It can be seen that the V I is increasing steadily when moving from
the finest to the coarsest resolution but does not exceed 10%, indicating a high level of similarity
between partitions. Right panel (5b): Heat map illustrating the value of V I between each pair of
the five data sets of different sampling frequencies. From the heat map, it is apparent that there is a
considerable degree of consistency across sampling frequencies, but the similarity degrades steadily
when moving from the finest to the coarsest resolution.
following array of time resolutions
∆t ∈ {1 day, 2 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month} . (19)
To measure the effects of the temporal resolution, we employ the index known as variation of
information (V I), an information-theoretic measure quantifying the difference between any two
partitions. Two different partitions can be represented by two N -dimensional vectors ~σ1 and ~σ2
whose i-th component σi denotes the module to which node i belongs. The (normalised) variation
of information is defined as
V I( ~σ1 : ~σ2) = 1− I( ~σ1 : ~σ2)
H( ~σ1 : ~σ2)
(20)
where I( ~σ1 : ~σ2) is the mutual information, which is defined as follows
I( ~σ1 : ~σ2) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
p(σ1i , σ
2
j ) log
[
p(σ1i , σ
2
j )
p(σ1i )p(σ
2
j )
]
(21)
(with p(σ1i ) being the probability for a node to belong to σi in partition 1, p(σ
2
j ) being the proba-
bility for a node to belong to σj in partition 2 and p(σ
1
i , σ
2
j ) being the joint probability distribution
for a node to belong to σi in partition 1 and to σj in partition 2) and H( ~σ1 : ~σ2) is the joint
entropy, which is defined as follows
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Figure 6.: Multifrequency heat map showing the normalised co-occurrence of different pairs of
issuers within the same community, for the same time period but over various temporal resolutions
of the original time series. The issuers have been ordered using hierarchical clustering with average
linkage to position issuers with a high degree of co-occurrence next to each other.
H( ~σ1 : ~σ2) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
p(σ1i , σ
2
j ) log
[
p(σ1i , σ
2
j )
]
. (22)
Notice that, unlike mutual information, the variation of information is a true metrics since
it satisfies the triangle inequality. The divergence from the community structure presented in
Section 3.2, for each additional set of time series is depicted by Figure 5a. From the chart, it
is apparent that V I is increasing steadily when moving from the finest to the coarsest resolution
but does not exceed 10% in any case, indicating a high level of similarity between partitions. The
value of the V I between each pair of data-sets is, instead, shown in Figure 5b. This result provides
some support for the conceptual premise that community structure does not (strongly) depend on
the level of temporal resolution at which our data-set is considered.
The V I-based analysis contributes to our understanding of the robustness of the community
structure with respect to different temporal resolutions; however, we would like to extend this kind
of analysis at the issuer level, by assessing how robust is the assignment of issuers to communities
by measuring the frequency with which any two issuers are assigned to the same community over
different temporal partitions. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 6. The heat map
shows how frequently issuers co-occur within the same communities across the time resolutions
considered here. In case two issuers are found within the same community for each time resolution,
the entry corresponding to the considered pair of issuers in the heat map is drawn in white, while
if they are never found within the same community the entry is drawn in black. As the heat
map shows, three ‘hard cores’ of issuers appear, indicating that the issuers belonging to them are
assigned to the same community for the vast majority of the temporal resolutions; in addition,
there are also few ‘soft issuers’ who move across communities for different time resolutions, offering
an explanation for the small variation observed in Figure 5.
Community detection: temporal stability. One of the major challenges that managers mea-
suring portfolio risk face is that of determining the appropriate period of history to use when
estimating correlations to be used in their models. According to Loretan and English (2000), using
a relatively short period of data might be dangerous: in case the employed period is uncharacter-
istically stable, in fact, the estimated correlations may be lower than average, leading to excessive
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Figure 7.: Left panel (7a): Divergence from initial community structure for the ensuing six-month
windows. The values of V I do not exceed 10% for any of the six-month windows, while no particular
trend can be observed. Right panel (7b): The heat map illustrates the value of V I between every
pair of six-month time windows, as well as the V I between each window and the total ten-year
period (rightmost column and bottom row). It can be seen that there is a high degree of community
coherence over time.
risk taking; on the other hand, if the used interval is relatively volatile, the resulting correlations
can be unrealistically low, leading to excessive risk aversion. However, choosing a longer time series
is not guaranteed to produce more reliable estimates: the ever-evolving nature of financial markets
deems undesirable to rely on data from the distant past. In order to be confident that the results
presented in Section 3.2 can provide useful insights for risk managers, it is required to study the
time dynamics of the detected communities.
To analyse the stability of communities over the course of time, we employ a non-overlapping
sliding window of six months. Figure 7a illustrates the divergence from the community structure
detected using the first six-month window throughout the years. It can be seen that there are no
significant fluctuations, with V I not exceeding 10% for any of the six-month periods. To further
improve our understanding on the community coherence, in Figure 7b we provide a heat map
showing the mutual V I between every two pairs of six-month windows. Each square in the matrix
represents the value of V I between the i-th and j-th six-month period, while the last row and
column represent the value of V I between each six-month period and the partition obtained using
the full ten-year sample. The results indicate that there was little movement of issuers between
communities during the ten-year period. In addition, it can be seen that there is little difference
between these periods and the community structure obtained when we using the entire ten-year
period.
Finally, having determined that the communities do not exhibit significant fluctuations over time,
we use the same sliding window to examine the stability of communities over time at the issuer
level. In a similar fashion to the temporal multiresolution analysis, we plot a heat map containing
the frequency with which each pair of issuers can be found within the same community over the
course of the ten-year time frame. As Figure 8 shows, pairs of issuers appearing to be in the same
community for all the six-month windows have white entries in the heat-map, while the entries
corresponding to pairs of issuers never appearing within the same community are drawn in black.
After a closer inspection, it can be seen that the three communities detected by using the full ten-
year history appear to be tight-knit and unwavering, thus maintaining a high degree of coherence
over the course of time. A small number of issuers moving fluidly from one community to another
can still be appreciated.
15
Figure 8.: Coherence of communities over time. The heat map shows the frequency of co-occurrence
of different pairs of issuers within the same community over time. The communities appear to be
tight-knit and unwavering, maintaining coherence over the course of the ten-year time frame. The
issuers have been ordered using hierarchical clustering with average linkage to position issuers with
a high degree of co-occurrence next to each other.
4. Default risk charge model
4.1. Model specification
Consider a portfolio of m issuers, indexed by i = 1, 2...m and a fixed time horizon of T = 1 year.
The overall portfolio loss is modelled by a random variable L, defined as the sum of the individual
losses on issuers’ default, i.e. L =
∑m
i=1 Li, with
Li = qieiYi (23)
where Li = qieiYi denotes the loss on issuer i, with ei and qi being, respectively, the exposure at
default and the loss given default of issuer i and Yi being the random default indicator taking
the value 1 if issuer i defaults before time T and 0 otherwise. In order to define the probability
distributions of Li’s, as well as their dependence structure, we rely on a factor model approach,
descending from the structural model of Merton (Merton 1974), which is widely used for portfo-
lio default risk modelling by regulators and financial institutions alike. Notable examples of this
approach include the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model (Gordy 2003), which is at the
heart of Basel II credit risk capital charge, as well as industrial adaptations of Merton model such
as the CreditMetrics (JP Morgan 1997) and KMV models (Bohn and Kealhofer 2001, Crosbie and
Bohn 2002).
Let us introduce a random variable Xi representing issuer i’s creditworthiness. In the same spirit
of Mertons structural model, we specify that default occurs before time T if the value of Xi lies
below a threshold di, or equivalently:
Yi := 1[−∞,di] (Xi) , (24)
where 1A(·) is the indicator function of set A. Hence, modelling Yi’s boils down to model the
creditworthiness indices Xi with i = 1...m, which are linearly dependent on a vector F of p < m
systematic factors satisfying F ∼ Np(0,Ω). Issuer i’s creditworthiness index is assumed to be driven
by an issuer-specific combination F˜i = α
ᵀ
i F of the systematic factors:
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Xi =
√
βiF˜i +
√
1− βii, (25)
where F˜i and 1...m are independent, standard normal variables (i.e. F˜i ∼ N(0, 1), ∀ i and i ∼
N(0, 1), ∀ i) and the latter ones model the idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient βi can be seen as a
measure of sensitivity of Xi to systematic risk, as it represents the proportion of the Xi variation
that is explained by the systematic factors. The assumption that Var[F˜i] = 1 implies that α
ᵀ
i Ωαi =
1 for all i. The correlations between asset returns are given by
ρ(Xi, Xj) = Cov[Xi, Xj ]
= (1− βi) 1{i=j} +
√
βiβjCov[F˜i, F˜j ]
= (1− βi) 1{i=j} +
√
βiβjα
ᵀ
i Ωαj
(26)
(since F˜i and 1...m are independent, standard normal variables and Var[Xi] = 1). In order to
set up the model we need to determine αi and βi for each issuer and Ω (while ensuring that
αᵀi Ωαi = 1).
We choose di such that P(Yi = 1) = pi, where pi is the marginal probability of default of issuer i.
As a result, di = F
−1
Xi
(pi), with FXi(·) being the cumulative distribution function of Xi. Given the
normality of Xi, it follows that di = Φ
−1(pi), with Φ−1(·) denoting the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. The portfolio loss can, then, be written as follows:
L =
m∑
i=1
qiei1[−∞,Φ−1(pi)]
(√
βiF˜i +
√
1− βii
)
. (27)
For p = 1, the specification above is equivalent to the ASRF model. In this model, the single
systematic factor affecting all issuers is usually interpreted as the state of the economy and the
correlation coefficients are regulatory prescribed. In multi-factor models (p ≥ 2), latent or observ-
able factors encompassing regional or industry characteristics are typically used by modellers to
capture the portfolios correlation structure.
4.2. Model calibration
Models used by banks for DRC calculations are required to account for systematic risk via multiple
systematic factors of two different types (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2016, Para-
graph 186(b)). For the first systematic factor, we consider a global factor that is common to all
issuers, reflecting the overall state of the economy. We adopt this approach due to relevant literature
suggesting strong dependence of changes in default risk on global effects (Aretz and Pope 2013).
For the second systematic factor we consider factors representing industry and region effects, as
well as community and subcommunity effects. Even though a model with three types of systematic
factors would not be in line with the regulatory requirements for the calculation of DRC, for com-
parison purposes we also consider a model with global, industry, and region systematic factors, an
approach commonly adopted in the industry for the calculation of IRC.
In addition to the types of systematic factors, the regulatory rule-set specifies that correlations
must be calibrated using credit spreads or listed equity prices over a period of at least ten years
that includes a period of stress. We calibrate the model presented in Section 4.1 using CDS spreads
covering the period between 1 January 2007-31 December 2016 which includes the ‘stressed’ period
between 2007 and 2009. In our model setting, the liquidity horizon is set as one year and, as
a result, the correlations should be measured over the same horizon. However, non-overlapping
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Table 4.: The table provides the statistics for the R2 between the individual issuers and systematic
factor(s). The model estimation is based on the following settings: global factor only (Model 1);
global and industry factors (Model 2); global and region factors (Model 3); global, region, and
industry factors (Model 4); global and community factors (Model 5); and global and subcommunity
factors (Model 6). Industry, region, community, and subcommunity factors are defined as cross-
sectional averages at each time point and taken as already decomposed into a global factor and
residuals. The estimation is based on non-overlapping monthly log-returns and conducted from
January 2007 to December 2016, which was identified as a recent 10-year period which included
the ‘stressed’ period between 2007 and 2009.
Individual R2 Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
versus Global Global and Global and Global, region, Global and Global and
systematic factor industry region and industry community subcommunity
factors only factors factors factors factors factors
Average 48.1% 54.5% 54.2% 58.1% 55.4% 58.2%
SD 15.8% 16.4% 17.6% 17.5% 16.7% 18.0%
Minimum 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 1.4% 1.4% 0.8%
Maximum 0.82% 84.1% 96.3% 96.5% 88.4% 92.6%
annual log-returns from ten years history contain only nine points, which is not sufficient to yield a
reliable correlation estimate. If overlapping log-returns are considered alternatively, the sample size
can be sufficiently big, but the linear relation between the data series can be distorted. Moreover,
certain bias can be introduced into the correlation estimate via auto-correlation, which usually
leads to over-estimations. Instead of using overlapping annual returns, we chose to use to monthly
non-overlapping returns over the ten-year period. This approach leads to a sufficient number of
data points for correlation estimation and can be seen as a reasonable compromise. The implied
hypothesis is that correlations measured over monthly and annual horizons are interchangeable and
can be used as a predictor for future one-year correlations. According to Wilkens and Predescu
(2017), this assumption can be questioned, but, it is hard to reject from a statistical point of view,
if one takes into account the uncertainty of the correlation measurement itself.
We start by scaling each individual time series to have zero mean and unit variance. At each time
point, global (XG,t), industry (XI(j),t), region (XR(k),t), community (XC(l),t) and subcommunity
(XS(n),t) returns are derived from the corresponding cross-section of the issuer returns. All the
resulting factor time series have zero mean. The dependence of the region, industry, community
and subcommunity factors on global returns is explored by running the following linear regression
models
XI(j),t = γI(j)XG,t + εI(j),t,
XR(k),t = γR(k)XG,t + εR(k),t,
XC(l),t = γC(l)XG,t + εC(l),t,
XS(n),t = γS(n)XG,t + εS(n),t
(28)
where γI(j), γR(k), γC(l) and γS(n) are coefficients weighing the global factor and εI(j),t, εR(k),t,
εC(l),t and εS(n),t are the industry-, region-, community- and subcommunity-specific residuals, re-
spectively. The full regression results on the basis of Equation (28) for the period between January
2007 to December 2016 can be found in Table A1 in Appendix A. The majority of the factor
returns move in line with the global returns, with coefficients not significantly different from one.
In addition, the proportion of variance explained by the global returns is high (as indicated by the
values of R2, between 63% and 96%), highlighting the leading role of the global factor.
Turning now to the case of a single issuer, it is important to note that by regressing the industry
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(XI(j)), region (XR(k)), community (XC(l)) and subcommunity (XS(n)) returns against the global
returns (XG), we have essentially orthogonalised the rest of the factors relative to the global factor.
Hence, in addition to the global returns (XG), we use the residuals εI(j), εR(k), εC(l), and εS(n) from
eq. (28) as explanatory factors for the returns of a single issuer, representing industry, region,
community, and subcommunity effects respectively. In the following we discuss the calibration of
a model with a global and a subcommunity factor; calibration of other model variants should then
be straightforward. Recall that issuer i’s creditworthiness index Xi follows the dynamics presented
in Section 4.1. In our case, F˜i := αG(i)XG + αS(i)S(i), where the coefficients αG(i) and αS(i) have
been rescaled so that F˜i ∼ N(0, 1), i.e.
αG(i) :=
αˆG(i)
Ψi
, αS(i) :=
αˆS(i)
Ψi
(29)
with αˆG,i and αˆS,i being the factor loadings of the regression model
Xi,t = αˆG(i)XG,t + αˆS(i)S(i),t + εi,t (30)
and Ψi = σ[αˆG(i)XG+ αˆS(i)S(i)]. Thus, we calibrate the factor loadings αˆG(i) and αˆS(i) by running
the above regression. If we collect XG and S(i) into a matrix Fi, then the least squares estimator
αˆi equalises the two sides of the following equation:
Xi = Fiαˆi (31)
or, in other words, αˆi, ∀ i represent estimates of the coefficients appearing in Equation (30):
αˆi = (F
ᵀ
i Fi)
−1(F ᵀi Xi). (32)
Finally, the coefficient βi from Section 4.1 is the R
2 of this regression, representing the proportion
of variance for Xi explained by the systematic factors.
We estimate the parameters of six model variants on the basis of the calibration process described
previously: global factor only (Model 1); global and industry factors (Model 2); global and region
factors (Model 3); global, region, and industry factors (Model 4); global and community factors
(Model 5) and global and subcommunity factors (Model 6). The statistics for the individual R2
versus systematic factors are compared in Table 4. As it can be seen from the table, not surprisingly,
the model based only on the global factor provides the worst fit to the data with an average R2
of 48.2%. After the introduction of the industry factor the average R2 increases to 54.5%. A
comparable value (54.2%) is obtained if instead of the industry factor we introduce a region factor.
The model based on global and community factors (Model 5) provides a slightly better fit than the
other two-factor models with an average R2 of 55.4%. The best fit is achieved by the model based
on global and subcommunity factors (Model 6) with an average R2 of 58.2%, outperforming even
the three-factor model based on global, region, and industry factors. This result is particularly
interesting since the difference in the average R2 between Model 6 and the other two-factor models
is comparable to the difference between the other two-factor models and the model based only on
the global factor.
Having estimated the factor loadings and covariance matrices for the six model variants, we
are able to obtain the distribution of the differences between the model-implied and empirical
(pairwise) correlations (shown in Figure 9): after close inspection, it becomes evident that the
distributions of the correlation errors based on Model 4 and Model 6 are heavier around zero and
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Figure 9.: The figure shows the distribution of the differences between the model-implied and empir-
ical (pairwise) correlations. As for the model, the six variants (global factor only, global/industry,
global/region, global/industry/region, global/community, global/subcommunity factors) are ex-
plored.
have thinner tails. The distribution of the actual empirical correlations is shown in Figure B1 in
Appendix B.
4.3. Numerical experiments
In order to study the properties of the framework presented in Section 4 we set up four synthetic
test portfolios:
• Portfolio A: Long-only portfolio consisting of 36 sovereign issuers from the iTraxx SovX
index family.
• Portfolio B: Long-only portfolio consisting of 89 corporate issuers (Financials and Non-
Financials) from the iTraxx Europe index.
• Portfolio C: Long-only consisting of 125 issuers from Portfolio and Portfolio B combined.
• Portfolio D: Long-short portfolio consisting of 22 long positions on issuers from Financials
and 22 short positions on issuers from Non-Financials from the iTraxx Europe index selected
such that the average default probability between the two groups is the same.
For the purposes of our numerical experiments, we use historical default rates per rating from S&P
Global Ratings (2019b) and S&P Global Ratings (2019a) as probabilities of default. The historical
defaults rates per rating are shown in Table 5. In accordance with regulatory requirements (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2016, Paragraph 186(b)), probabilities of default are subject
to a floor of 3 bps. The detailed composition of the synthetic portfolios in terms of rating, as well
as the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding probabilities of default are shown in
Table 6.
As far as the exposure at default is concerned, for the long-only portfolios we consider a constant
and equally weighted exposure for each issuer such that ei = 1/m for all i = 1...m and
∑m
i=1 = 1.
For the long-short portfolio we consider ei∈Financials = 1/22 and ei/∈Financials = −1/22, and as a
result
∑m
i=1 ei = 0. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, the loss given default parameter is set to 1
for all issuers, i.e. qi = 1, i = 1...m.
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Table 5.: The table provides the historical default rates (%) per rating. Source S&P Global Ratings
(2019b,a)
Rating
Corporates Sovereigns
(1981-2018) (1975-2018)
AAA 0.00 0.00
AA 0.02 0.00
A 0.06 0.00
BBB 0.17 0.00
BB 0.65 0.49
B 3.44 2.82
CCC/C 26.63 41.56
Table 6.: The table provides the composition of the synthetic test portfolios in terms of rating, as
well as the mean and standard deviation for the corresponding probabilities of default.
AAA AA A BBB BB Average PD SD PD
Portfolio A 4 7 6 14 5 0.09% 0.16%
Portfolio B - 6 32 51 - 0.12% 0.05%
Portfolio C 4 13 38 65 5 0.11% 0.10%
Portfolio D - 6 30 8 - 0.08% 0.05%
Table 7.: The table provides the quantiles of the loss distribution for the corresponding portfolios
and for each of the six model configurations.
α
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6:
Global Global and Global and Global, region, Global and Global and
factor industry region and industry community subcommunity
only factors factors factors factors factors
Portfolio A: 0.99 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8%
Sovereign bonds, 0.995 2.8% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 2.8% 2.8%
long position 0.999 8.3% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 8.3% 11.1%
Portfolio B: 0.99 3.4% 3.4% 2.2% 2.2% 3.4% 3.4%
Corporate bonds, 0.995 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6%
long position 0.999 14.6% 14.6% 16.9% 16.9% 15.7% 16.9%
Portfolio C: 0.99 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Combination of 0.995 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8%
portfolios A and B 0.999 12.8% 12.8% 13.6% 13.6% 12.8% 13.6%
Portfolio D: 0.99 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Corporate bonds, 0.995 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 0.0% 4.5% 4.5%
long/short position 0.999 9.1% 13.6% 9.1% 9.1% 13.6% 13.6%
We, then, generate portfolio loss distributions and derive the associated risk measures by means
of Monte Carlo simulations. This process entails generating joint realizations of the systematic
and idiosyncratic risk factors and comparing the resulting critical variables with the corresponding
default thresholds. By this comparison, we obtain the default indicator Yi for each issuer and this
enables us to calculate the overall portfolio loss for this trial. A liquidity horizon of 1 year is assumed
throughout and the results are based on calibrations according to Section 4.2 and simulations with
ten million sample paths each. For a given confidence level α ∈ [0, 1], the VaRα is defined as the
α-quantile of the loss distribution:
VaRα(L) = inf{l ∈ R : P(L ≤ l) ≥ α)}. (33)
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Figure 10.: Quantiles of the loss distributions obtained from the six model variants
(global factor only, global/industry, global/region, global/industry/region, global/community,
global/subcommunity factors) for the four synthetic test portfolios.
Since both IRC in Basel 2.5 and DRC in FRTB are calculated based on a 99.9% VaR over a
capital horizon of one year, we rely on this risk measure in order to compare the impact of different
correlation model configurations on portfolio risk. We calculate VaRα(L) for selected confidence
levels α ∈ {0.99, 0.995, 0.999}, including the 0.999 which corresponds to DRC, for each of the six
model configurations and the synthetic test portfolios. The results are illustrated in Table 7 and
Figure 10.
For Portfolio A, consisting of long positions on sovereign issuers, Model 1 and Model 5 yield
a DRC figure of 8.3%, while the other model variants yield a slightly more conservative figure
at 11.1%. For Porfolio B, consisting of long positions on corporates, the values are higher and
more variable, with Model 1 and Model 2 producing a DRC at 14.6%, Model 5 at 15.7%, and
the rest of the models at 16.9%. For the more diversified Portfolio C, models 1,2, and 5 produce
a DRC of 12.8%, while models 3,4,6 produce slightly higher figures at 13.6%. Finally, for the
long/short Portfolio D, models 1,3, and 4 yield a DRC of 9.1%, while models 2,5, and 6 yield a
more conservative 13.6%.
In general, different model variants produce less variable losses for lower quantiles. Furthermore,
although it is not straightforward to draw solid conclusions on one model being consistently more
conservative, it seems that model based on global and subcommunity factors (Model 6) is among the
most conservative models for all four portfolios, while the one-factor model (Model 1) is consistently
among the least conservative. In addition, the DRC values produced by models 3 and 4 are in
agreement for all the portfolios.
Another noteworthy observation has to do with the tails of the generated loss distributions. By
analysing the relationship between the quantiles presented in Table 7, it can be seen that all model
variants seem to produce distributions with heavier tails than the standard normal distribution.
For instance, the ratio between the 0.999 and the 0.99 quantile for Portfolio A is 2.96 for Model 1
and Model 5, and 3.96 for all the other model variants, compared to 1.33 for the standard normal
distribution. Similar tail behaviour can be observed for all the portfolios.
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5. Concluding remarks
One of the most challenging problems in the study of complex systems is that of identifying
the mesoscopic organisation of the constituting units. This amounts to detecting groups of units
which are more densely connected internally than with the rest of the system. In case the units
are represented by time series, a common approach is to regard correlation matrices as weighted
networks and employ standard network community detection methods. Since such an approach can
introduce biases, in this paper we adopt a principled approach based on Random Matrix Theory,
leading to an algorithm that is able to identify internally correlated and mutually anti-correlated
communities, in a multiresolution fashion.
Our methods are applied to the analysis of CDS time series with the aim of identifying mesoscopic
groups of issuers whose similarities cannot be traced back to industry sectors or geographical
regions. We use ten years of data including the stressed period between 2007 and 2009. The analysis
reveals several interesting results with regards to the community structure. In addition, our results
show that different time resolutions yield similar community structures and that these structures
are stable over time; this renders the obtained communities useful for risk models.
Based on the detected communities, we derive factors and build a model for portfolio credit
risk that is in line with regulatory requirements for the calculation of DRC. This model is then
compared with industry-standard models based on global, country, and region factors. The models
based on global, communities, and subcommunities factors provide a better fit to the data and
lower error between the model-implied and the empirical pairwise correlations compared to the
other two-factor models.
To further explore the properties of the obtained factor models we set up four synthetic portfolios
and generate loss distributions via Monte Carlo simulations. The results show that the model based
on global and subcommunity factors is consistently among the most conservative. As a more general
observation, all models produce distributions with heavy tails and the variability is higher in the
higher quantiles, including the 0.999 which is of particular interest for DRC.
The present work represents a first step towards incorporating community detection in risk
models that can be used in a realistic set up. Further research could usefully explore applications in
portfolio optimisation and hedging of credit sensitive instruments. An interesting avenue for further
study that would establish the value of our findings for portfolio construction could be a rigorous
analysis of the diversification potential for portfolios of risky instruments across communities and
subcommunities, similar to the one conducted by Aretz and Pope (2013) for country and industry
factors.
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Appendix A: Full regression results on the basis of Equation (28)
This appendix presents the full regression results for the time-series regression models that are
presented in Equation (28) of the main article.
Table A1.: This table provides the results of the industry, region, community, and subcommu-
nity factor analysis derived from CDS spread returns. The analysis is based on non-overlapping
monthly log-returns and conducted over the period January 2007 through December 2016. After
standardisation the CDS returns are used to derive global, industry, region and community factors
as cross-sectional averages at each time point. The industry, region, and community factors are
regressed onto the global factor; coefficients (γI , γR, γC , and γSC respectively) as well as R
2 are
provided in the table, complemented by the standard deviation of the residual returns. t-tests are
conducted to evaluate whether the coefficients differ from one.
Industry γI t-statistic p-value R
2 σI σG
Basic Materials 1.027 0.993 32.3% 92.3% 20.1%
67.9%
Consumer goods 0.988 -0.586 55.9% 95.2% 15.1%
Consumer services 0.962 -1.676 9.6% 93.7% 16.9%
Energy 1.021 0.491 62.5% 82.7% 31.7%
Financials 1.019 0.603 54.8% 90.1% 23.0%
Government 1.042 1.035 30.3% 84.6% 30.2%
Health care 0.880 -3.306 0.1% 83.2% 26.9%
Industrials 1.028 1.493 13.8% 96.3% 13.6%
Technology 0.890 -4.178 0.0% 90.7% 19.4%
Telecommunication services 1.023 0.982 32.8% 94.0% 17.5%
Utilities 1.009 0.350 72.7% 93.2% 18.5%
Region γR t-statistic p-value R
2 σR σG
Africa 1.056 0.936 35.1% 72.8% 43.8%
67.9%
Asia 1.115 2.883 0.5% 86.9% 29.3%
Eastern Europe 1.065 1.056 29.3% 71.8% 45.3%
Europe 1.021 0.928 35.5% 94.5% 16.7%
India 1.131 1.792 7.6% 67.1% 53.8%
Latin America 1.072 1.221 22.4% 73.6% 43.6%
Middle East 0.928 -1.282 20.2% 69.7% 41.6%
North America 0.926 -3.702 0.0% 94.9% 14.6%
Oceania 1.104 2.688 0.8% 87.3% 28.7%
Community γC t-statistic p-value R
2 σC σG
A 0.967 -1.196 23.4% 91.5% 20.1%
67.9%
B 0.987 -0.526 60.0% 92.6% 18.9%
C 1.061 1.852 6.6% 89.9% 24.2%
D 0.989 -0.220 82.6% 76.8% 36.9%
Subcommunity γS t-statistic p-value R
2 σS σG
A1 0.943 -1.665 0.098 86.5% 25.3%
67.9%
A2 0.934 -2.052 0.042 87.6% 23.9%
A3 1.093 2.260 0.026 85.6% 30.4%
A4 0.999 -0.015 0.988 76.5% 37.5%
B1 0.952 -1.516 0.132 88.5% 23.2%
B2 1.067 2.267 0.025 91.8% 21.7%
C1 1.022 0.474 0.636 80.4% 34.3%
C2 0.995 -0.141 0.888 88.4% 24.5%
C3 1.154 3.665 0.000 86.5% 31.0%
D1 1.026 0.379 0.705 65.5% 50.5%
D2 0.895 -3.202 0.002 86.4% 24.1%
D3 0.980 -0.295 0.768 62.8% 51.2%
D4 1.123 1.664 0.099 66.2% 54.6%
D5 1.081 1.122 0.264 65.7% 53.0%
D6 1.011 0.168 0.867 65.0% 50.4%
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Appendix B: Empirical pairwise correlations
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Figure B1.: Empirical pairwise correlation. The figure shows the distribution of the CDS spread
correlation during the period January 2007 through December 2016, based on Markit data for 786
issuers. The return correlation is calculated from non-overlapping monthly log-returns.
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